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Measurable Systems and Behavioral Sciences∗
V. I. Danilov† and A. Lambert-Mogiliansky‡
Abstract
Individual choices often depend on the order in which the decisions are made. In
this paper, we expose a general theory of measurable systems (an example of which is
an individual’s preferences) allowing for incompatible (non-commuting) measurements.
The basic concepts are illustrated in an example of non-classical rational choice. We
conclude with a discussion of some of the basic properties of non-classical systems in
the context of social sciences. In particular, we argue that the distinctive feature of
non-classical systems translates into a formulation of bounded rationality.
JEL: D80, C65, B41
Keywords: non-classical system, incompatible measurements, orthospace, state,
properties, bounded rationality
1 Introduction
In economics, an agent is defined by her preferences and beliefs, in psychology by her values,
attitudes and feelings. One also talks about “eliciting” or “revealing” preferences and atti-
tudes. This tacitly presumes that those properties are sufficiently well-defined (determined)
and stable. In particular, it is assumed that the mere fact of subjecting a person to an elic-
itation procedure, i.e., to “measure” her taste does not affect the taste. Yet, psychologists
are well aware that simply answering a question about a feeling may modify a person’s state
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of mind. For instance when asking a person “Do you feel angry?” a “yes” answer may take
her from a blended emotional state to an experience of anger. But before answering the
question, it may be neither true nor false that the person was angry. It may be a “jumble of
emotions”[25]. Similarly, Erev, Bornstein and Wallsten (1993) show in an experiment that
simply asking people to state the subjective probability they assign to some event affects the
way they make subsequent decisions. The so-called “disjunction effect” (Tversky and Shafir
(1992)) may also be viewed in this perspective. In a well-known experiment, the authors
find that significantly more students report they would buy a non-refundable Hawai vacation
if they knew whether they passed the exam or failed compared to when they don’t know
the outcome of the examination. In the case they passed, some buy the vacation to reward
themselves. In the case they failed, some purchase the vacation to console themselves. When
they don’t know, a seemingly inconsistent behavior is observed: fewer vacations are being
purchased than in any one of the two possible events.
In the examples above, the mere fact of subjecting an agent to a procedure that reveals
her feeling, preferences or beliefs seems to affect her. In this paper, we propose to adopt a
measurement theoretical approach to behavior: actual behavior reveals preferences (or be-
liefs) in the sense of being the outcome of a measurement of those preferences. Interestingly,
Kahneman and A. Tversky explicitly discuss some behavioral anomalies in terms of mea-
surement theory: “Analogously, - to classical physical measurement - the classical theory of
preference assumes that each individual has a well-defined preference order and that different
methods of elicitation produce the same ordering of options”. But, ”In these situations - of
violation of procedural invariance - observed preferences are not simply read off from some
master list; they are actually constructed in the elicitation process.” ([12] p. 504). A. Sen
[24] also emphasizes that the “act of choice” has implications for preferences. In this work
we adopt the view that performing a measurement on a system generally changes its state.
In particular, an experiment or a decision situation that reveals a person’s preferences affects
that person’s preferences.
Is it possible to build a predictive model of a system whose state changes as we perform
measurements on it? We assert that it is if the interaction between systems and measurement
instruments satisfies some natural conditions. We formulate them as axioms and show that
the state space is endowed with the structure of an atomistic orthomodular orthospace and
the states are realized as probability measures on the state space.
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Of course, our formalization does not build on an empty spot. The question of modeling
a system that changes when being measured is at the heart of Quantum Mechanics (QM).
Birkhoff and von Neumann’s seminal article from 1936 initiated a rich literature on the
mathematical foundations of QM. For an excellent review of the field see the introductory
chapter in Coecke, Moore and Wilce (2000). Recently, the interest for QM has been rapidly
expanding to other fields. Partly, this is due to the development of quantum computing,
which inspires physicists and more recently economists to investigate the use of quantum
information in games (Eisert (1999), La Mura (2004)). Another avenue of research has
emerged in response to observations that classical (or macro) objects (e.g. human perception
or preferences) can exhibit properties specific to QM-objects. In Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir
and Zwirn (2003), a Hilbert space model is proposed to describe economic agents’ preferences
and decision-making. Aerts (1994), Busemeyer and Townsend (2004) and Khrenikov et
al. (2003) investigate quantum-like phenomena in psychology. The basic idea is that the
mathematical formalism of QM, often referred to as “quantum logic” rather than its physical
content, is a suitable model for describing, explaining and predicting human behavioral
phenomena in psychology and social sciences.
In this paper we expose the foundations of a general measurement theory. The objective
with the proposed formulation is to allow assessing the relevance of this framework for
social sciences including for the analysis of individual choice and in particular for modelling
bounded rationality.
Section 2 offers a few examples of quantum and quantum-like behavior. In Section 3 we
introduce basic notions of measurement theory, namely that of measurement and of state.
They are illustrated in models of rational choice in Section 4. Axioms and their consequences
are exposed in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 discusses an interpretation of the basic axioms
and properties for behavioral sciences.
2 Examples
Example 1: The spin of an electron
An electron is endowed with several characteristics including the spin. The spin is an
intrinsic property of any particle and corresponds to a magnetic moment which can be
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measured.1
It is well-known that the outcome of the measurement is always ±1/2 (in some units)
independently of the orientation of the measurement device. If we measure a concrete elec-
tron along some axis x and obtain result +1/2, then a new measurement along the same
axis will give the same result. Assume we prepare a number of electrons this way. If we, for
the second measurement, modify the orientation of the axis, e.g., the measurement device
is turned by 90◦, the result now shows equal probability for both outcomes. As we anew
perform the measurement along the x-axis, we do not recover our initial result. Instead, the
outcome will be −1/2 with .5 probability.
We limit ourselves to noting that once the spin of the electron along some axis is known,
the results of the measurement of the spin of that electron along some other axis has a
probabilistic character. This is a central feature. In the classic world, we are used to deal
with probabilities. But there the explanation for the random character of the outcome is
easily found. We simply do not know the exact state of the system, which we represent by a
probability mixture of other states. If we sort out this mixture in the end we obtain a pure
state and then the answer will be determinate. In the case with the spin, it is not possible to
simultaneously eliminate randomness in the outcome of measurements relative to different
axis.
Example 2: A fly in a box
Consider a box divided by two baffles into four rooms (left/front (LF), Left/Back (LB),
RF and RB. In this box, we hold a fly that flies around. Because of the baffles, it is limited
in its movements to the room where it is.
Assume that we only have access to two types of measurements. The first allows answer-
ing the question whether the fly is in the Left (L) or the Right (R) half of the box. And,
in the process of measurement, the baffle between the Front (F) and the Back (B) half of
the box is lifted while the separation between Right and Left is left in place. During that
process, the fly flies back and forth from Front to Back. When the measurement operation
is over and the baffle between Front and Back put back in place, the position of the fly is
therefore quite random (LF or LB). The same applies for the measurement of Front/Back.
1Stern and Gerlagh created an instrument such that the interaction between the magnetic moment of the
electron and that of the experimental setup generates the splitting of a beam of electrons. A measure of the
deviation can be interpreted of the measurement of spin (along some orientation).
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Assume that we have performed the measurement L/R and obtained answer L. Repeating
that same measurement even 100 times we will always obtain the same answer L. But if we
do, in between, the F/B measurement, we have equal (for the sake of simplicity) chances
to obtain R as L. We see that the behavior of our system reminds of that of the spin
(when the Stern-Gerlach device is rotated by an angle of 90◦). Here the position of the fly
cannot be determined with certainty with respect to the two measurements (LR) and (FB)
simultaneously. The measurement affects the system in an uncontrollable and unavoidable
way. This simple example exhibits all basic features of the non-classical measurement theory
developed in this paper.
Example 3: Attitudes and preferences
Consider the following situation. We are dealing with a group of individuals and we are
interested in their preferences (or attitudes). We dispose of two tests.
The first test is a questionnaire corresponding to a Prisoners’ Dilemma against an anony-
mous opponent. The options are cooperate (C) and defect (D). The second test corresponds
to the first mover’s choice in an Ultimatum Game (UG). The choice is between making an
offer of (9,1) or of (4,6).2
The observations we are about to describe cannot be obtained in a world of rational
agents whose preferences are fully described by their monetary payoff.3 But this is not our
point. Our point is that such observations exhibit the same patterns as the ones we described
in the spin and fly example above.
Suppose that we have the following observations. The respondents who answer C to the
first questionnaire repeat (with probability close to one) their answer when asked immedi-
ately once more. We now perform the second test (UG) and the first test (PD) again. In that
last PD test we observe that not all respondents repeat their initial answers. A (significant)
share of those who previously chose to cooperate now chooses to defect.4
2In the Ultimatum game the first mover makes an offer. The respondent either accepts the deal and the
payoffs are distributed accordingly. Or he refuses in which case no one receives any payoff.
3Game Theory uniquely predicts behavior: people defect (D) in the PD and (with common knowledge
of rationality) they offer (9,1) in UG. Experimentalists have however taught us to distinguish between
monetary payoffs, which can be controlled and preferences, which may include features beside monetary
payoffs unknown to the designer of the experiment.
4D. Balkenberg and T. Kapplan (University of Exeter, unpublished) conducted an experiment with those
two same games but with two populations of respondents. They investigate the frequency of the choices
when the two games are played in one order compared to when they are played in the reverse order. The
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How do we understand this kind of behavior? When deciding in the PD our respondent
may feel conflicted: she wants to give trust and encourage cooperation, but she does not like
to be taken advantage of. Consider the case when her optimistic ‘I’ takes over: she decides to
cooperate. When asked again immediately after, her state of mind is that of the optimistic
‘I’ so she feels no conflict: she confirms her first choice. Now she considers the UG. The deal
(4,6) is very generous but it may be perceived as plain stupid. The (9,1) offer is not generous
but given the alternative it should not be perceived as insulting. She feels conflicted again
because her optimistic ‘I’ does not provide clear guidance. Assume she chooses (9,1). Now
considering the Prisoners’ Dilemma again, she feels conflicted anew. Indeed, her choice of
(9,1) is not in line with the earlier optimistic mood so she may now choose to defect.5
As in the spin and the fly example, the measurement (elicitation of preferences) affects
the agent in an uncontrollable way so the observed behavior (measurement outcomes) may
exhibit instances characteristic for quantum-like systems.
3 Measurements and states
In this section we introduce and discuss two basic concepts of the theory, namely the concepts
of measurement and of state.
3.1 Measurements
A system is anything that we can performmeasurements on. A measurement is an interaction
between a system and some measurement device, which yields some result, the outcome of the
measurement that we can observe and record. The set of possible outcomes of a measurement
M is denoted O(M). For instance in the case with the Stern-Gerlach experimental setup,
we let the electron travel through a non-homogeneous magnetic field and observe deviation
either up or down. In the example with the fly we lift up a baffle and observe in which half
of the box the fly is located. In our third example, we let people play the Prisoner Dilemma
(and the UG) and observe their choice.
data shows an impact of the first choice on the second which is characteristic of non-classical measurements.
5We do not in any manner mean that the proposed description in terms of inner conflict is the only
possible one. A variety of psychological stories are consistent with such phenomena of non-commutativity.
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First-kindness
Measurements constitute a special class of interactions. We focus on non-destructive
measurements, which means that the system is not destroyed in the process of measurement
so we can perform new measurements on the system. In particular, we can perform a
measurement M twice in a row. If the outcomes of the two measurements always coincide,
we say that the measurement M is a first-kind measurement.6
In other words the results of a first-kind measurement are repeatable (reproducible). This
is a very important point that deserves some additional comments. One may wonder why a
“measurement” would fail to satisfy the property of first-kindness. There are several reasons
for that. A first and most important reason is that the system is evolving. For instance, the
thirst of a person running a marathon is not the same from one time to another along the
race. In this paper we focus on systems that do not have an own dynamics (or alternatively
on situations where measurements are made so close in time that we can disregard the own
dynamics). A second reason for failing first-kindness is noise in the measurement instrument
itself. We shall assume that measurements do not bring in own uncertainty. A third reason
is that the measurement operation actually is a combination of incompatible measurements.
We return to this point soon.
In what follows, we assume that all measurements are first-kind. Indeed, if a measurement
is not first-kind it is unclear what we measure and what the relation is between the outcome
of the measurement and our system. Of course, the question about first-kindness of any
concrete measurement is an experimental one.
Compatibility
Two measurements are compatible if they, roughly speaking, can be performed simultane-
ously or more precisely, if the performance of one measurement does not affect the result of
the other. Suppose that the first measurement gave outcome o; then we perform the second
measurement and the first one anew. In case we are dealing with compatible measurements
we obtain outcome o with certainty.
Given two compatible measurements M and N we can construct a third finer measure-
ment. We may performM and thereafterN and view this as a new (compound) measurement
6The term “first-kind” measurement was proposed by W. Pauli. J. von Neumann used the following
formulation: ”If the physical quantity is measured twice in succession on a system S then we get the same
value each time.”
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M ∗N with outcome set O(M)×O(N). Because of compatibility, the measurement M ∗N
is a first-kind measurement.
If all measurements are compatible we can substitute them with a single finest (complete)
measurement, which is also first-kind. Performing that measurement we learn everything
about the system. Such a system is classical.
The existence of incompatible measurements is a distinctive feature of non-classical sys-
tems. It is closely related to the impact of measurements on the state and the existence of
“dispersed” states (see next subsection).
In the examples of Section 2 all measurements were incompatible.
3.2 States
Measurable systems
As we perform a measurement and observe its result we learn something about a system.
All the information that we have about a system is “encapsulated” in the state of the system.
The state is the result of past measurements and it is the basis for making predictions of
future measurements. A theory (or a model) of a system should describe the set of states,
the results of any measurement in every state and the change in the state induced by any
measurement.7
The state of a system predicts the result of any measurement. But we do not assume that
it predicts a unique outcome. We only assume that the state determines the probabilities
for the outcomes, that is it determines a random outcome.
In order to avoid technical subtleties associated with the notion of probability, we shall
in what follows assume that the sets O(M) are finite. In such a case, a probabilistic measure
(or a random element) on O(M) is a collection of non-negative numbers (probabilities) µ(o)
for each o ∈ O(M) subjected to the condition
∑
o∈O(M) µ(o) = 1. The set (a simplex indeed)
of probabilistic measures on O(M) is denoted ∆(O(M)). In such a way the state s defines
a random outcome in O(M), that is a point µM(s) ∈ ∆(O(M)) for every measurement M .
Of course, the random outcome µM(s) can be degenerated, that is µM(o|s) = 1 for some
outcome o ∈ O(M). In the general case, the outcome is random; moreover, we are interested
in systems with “intrinsic uncertainty”. We return to this central point later, for now we
7If the system has an own dynamic the model should be enriched with a description of its evolution over
time.
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note that in the general case measurements impact on (change) the state. Indeed, let s
be a state such that the outcome of a measurement M is not uniquely determined. After
having performed measurement M (and obtained outcome o) the new state s′ of the system
differs from s because (according to the first-kindness of M) now the result of M is uniquely
determined and equal to o.
Definition. A measurable system is a system equipped with a set M of first-kind
measurements. A model of a measurable system includes the following three collections of
data:
1) a set of states S ;
2) an outcome mapping, µM : S→ ∆(O(M)) for every measurement M ∈M;
3) a transition mapping, τM,o : S → S for every measurement M ∈ M and any of its
outcome o ∈ O(M).
The first mapping defines the probabilities for the possible outcomes when performing
measurementM in an arbitrary state s. The second mapping τM,o points out where the state
s goes (transits) as we perform measurement M and obtain outcome o ∈ O(M). We have
to recognize that the mappings τM,o are not defined for those states in which the outcome o
is impossible.
It is useful at this point to introduce a few notions that we also use later. Let M be a
measurement and A ⊂ O(M). Denote
EM (A) = {s ∈ S, µM(A|s) :=
∑
o∈A
µM(o|s) = 1}.
The set EM(A) consists of the states endowed with the following property: the result of the
measurement M belongs to A for sure. The set EM (o) for o ∈ O(M) is called the eigenset
of measurement M corresponding to outcome o.
In these terms the mapping τM,o is not defined on the subset EM(O(M) \ {o}), where o
can not be an outcome of M . The image of τM,o coincides with the eigenset EM(o).
Pure states
Although it is not necessary, we shall suppose that two states coincide if all their pre-
dictions are the same. (Here we follow Mackey: “A state is a possible simultaneous set of
statistical distributions of the observables.”). In that case, we can consider the set S as some
subset of the convex set ×M∈M∆(O(M)).
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This allows to speak about mixtures of states. A state σ is called a (convex or proba-
bilistic) mixture of states s and t with (non-negative) weights α and 1− α, if
µM(o|σ) = αµM(o|s) + (1− α)µM(o|t)
for any M ∈ M and any o ∈ O(M). Mixtures of three or more states are defined similarly.
A state is said to be pure if it is not a non-trivial mixture of other states.
Without loss of generality one can suppose that the set of states S is convex (as a subset
of ×M∈M∆(O(M))). The subset P of pure states is the set of extreme points of the convex
set S, P = ext(S). In the sequel we assume that S is the convex hull of P, S = co(P).
Moreover, it is quite natural to assume that the transition mappings are linear (i.e., are
compatible with the convex structure on S). For this reason we can work with the set of
pure states P instead of S. Of course, we should keep in the mind that the transition state
τM,o(s) can be mixed.
In the classical world, pure states are dispersion-free, that is the outcome of any mea-
surement performed on a system in a pure state is uniquely determined. Randomness in the
results of a measurement indicates that the system is in a mixed state. One can sort out (or
filter) this mixture by making measurements so as to eventually obtain a pure state.
A distinctive feature of non-classical systems is the existence of dispersed (that is non
dispersion-free) pure states. This feature can be called “intrinsic uncertainty”. It is closely
related to two other properties of non-classical systems: the existence of incompatible mea-
surements and the impact of measurements on states. If a state is dispersion-free i.e., the
outcome of every possible measurement is uniquely determined, there is no reason for the
state to change. If all pure states are dispersion-free then measurements do not impact on
pure states and therefore all measurements are compatible. On the contrary, if a state is
dispersed then by necessity it will be modified by an appropriate measurement. On the
other hand, the change in a pure state is the reason for incompatibility of measurements.
The initial outcome of the first measurement M is not repeated because the system has been
modified by the second measurement N .
4 An illustration: non-classical rational choice
Let us illustrate the above introduced notions in (thought) examples of non-classical rational
choice behavior.
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We shall consider a situation where an agent is making a choice out of a set of alternatives
X . A primitive measurement is a choice from a subset A ⊂ X ; the set of outcomes of the
measurement is A (i.e. we consider single-valued choices). For this reason we denote such a
choice-measurement A. A main idea is that a choice out of “small” subsets is well-defined
and rational. By well-defined we mean that the corresponding measurement is first-kind. By
rational we mean that consecutive choices from “small” subsets satisfy Houthakker’s axiom
(or the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives, IIA). Our motivation is that
an agent may, in his mind, structure any “small” set of alternatives, i.e., he is capable of
simultaneously comparing those alternatives. He may not be able to do that within a “big”
set (which we interpret as bounded rationality, see Section 7). This does not means that
our agent cannot make a choice from a “big” set. For example, he might use an appropriate
sequence of binary comparisons and choose the last winning alternative. However, such a
compound choice-measurement would not in general be first-kind.
We formulate Houthakker’s axiom in the following way. Let A and B be two “small”
subset, and A ⊂ B. In our context, Houthakker’s axiom consists of two parts:
1) Suppose the agent chooses from B an element a which also belongs to A. If the
consecutive measurement is A then the agent chooses a.
2) Suppose the agent chooses from A an element a. If the consecutive measurement is B
then the outcome of the choice is not in A \ {a}.
In order to be more concrete, we shall consider as “small” subsets of the size 3 or less.
We begin with the case when all choice-measurements are compatible. Performing binary
choices we obtain some binary relation≺ onX . From ternary choices we see that this relation
is transitive so that the relation ≺ is a linear order. Therefore, it is natural to identify the
set P of pure states with the set of linear orders on X . We obtain the well-known classical
model.
We now relax the assumption of compatibility of all choice-measurements and consider
three different models.
Model 1. X includes three alternatives a, b and c. To define a model we need to define
the set of states, the outcome and the transition mappings.
Let the set of pure states P consists of three states denoted [a], [b] and [c]. When the
agent is asked to choose an item out of X he chooses a in state [a], b in [b], and c in [c].
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The choice-measurement X does not change the state. When the agent is asked to choose
an item out of {a, b}, a choice-measurement that we denote by ab, he chooses a in the state
[a], b in [b]; in the state [c] he chooses a and b with equal chances (and transits into [a] or [b]
correspondingly). Symmetrically for the choice-measurements ac and bc.
It is clear that Houthakker’s axiom is satisfied in this model. Note that the choice
measurements are incompatible. Indeed, let for instance the agent be in the state [c] and
choose c out of X . We then ask her to choose out of {a, b}. After that choice-measurement
she chooses a or b out of X but not c.
Model 2. The set of alternatives X is the same as in the previous model. But the set of
states differs. Now we identify (pure) states with outcomes of our four choice-measurements
ab, ac, bc, abc. That is P = {ab, ab, ac, ac, bc, bc, abc, abc, abc}. Here ac denotes the
choice of item a out of {a, c} and so on.
To define the model we have to specify the outcomes of the measurements and the
corresponding state transition.
Let the state be abc. The outcome of measurement abc is obvious, as well as that of
measurements ab and bc (by Houthakker’s axiom). The corresponding new states are abc, ab
and bc respectively. But what about choice-measurement ac? We assume that (with equal
chances) the new state is ac or ac.
Let now the state be ab. By definition b is the outcome of measurement ab and the state
does not change. Suppose that we perform the choice-measurement . We assume that the
new state is abc with probability 1/3 and is abc with probability 2/3. Houthakker’s axiom
says that a cannot be the outcome the abc measurement. Suppose that the measurement ac
is performed. The new state is ac with probability 2/3 and ac with probability 1/3. Similarly,
if we perform measurement bc we obtain c with probability 1/3 and b with probability 2/3.
The outcomes and the transitions into other states are defined symmetrically. This
completes the definition of our model which obviously satisfies the Houthakker axiom. Model
2 describes a rational (non-classical) choice behavior as does Model 1. Yet, the pure states
cannot be identified with orderings of the alternatives as in the classical model.
Clearly, the eigensets of the measurement abc are the one-element sets {abc}, {abc}
and {abc}. The eigensets of measurement ab look more interesting. They are the two-
elements sets {ab, abc} and {ab, abc}. The eigensets of the measurements bc and ac are
defined similarly. Here is the full list of the properties:
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a) 3 one-element subsets: {abc}, {abc}, {abc} (represented by the nodes of the second
line from below in the lattice below);
b) 6 two-element subsets: {ab, abc}, {ab, abc}, {ac, abc}, {ac, abc}, {bc, abc}, {bc, abc} (they
are represented by the nodes of the third line from below in the lattice);
c) 3 four-element subsets: {abc, abc, ac, bc}, {abc, abc, ab, bc}, {abc, abc, ac, ab}
(represented by the nodes of the fourth line of the lattice);
d) the empty set ∅ and the whole set P (respectively the bottom and the upper node in
the lattice).
Note that the intersection of properties is a property as well. The lattice of the properties
is drawn below:
❞
❞ ❞ ❞
❞ ❞
❞ ❞ ❞
❞
✚
✚
✚
✚❂ ❄
❩
❩
❩
❩⑦
❅
❅
❅❘
 
 
 ✠
❩
❩
❩
❩⑦❄
✚
✚
✚
✚❂
❞ ❞
❆
❆❯
✁
✁☛
❞ ❞
❏
❏
❏❫
❅
❅❘
✓
✓
✓✴
 
 ✠
◗
◗
◗
◗◗s
✑
✑
✑
✑✑✰
✟✟✟✟✙
❍❍❍❍❥
Figure 1
We note also that the lattice is not atomistic (not all elements can be written as the join of
atoms).
Model 3. Here the set X consists of four items: a, b, c and d. For any A ⊂ X with 3
or 2 elements the corresponding choice-measurement A is first-kind. We assume as before
that Houthakker’s axiom holds in any two consecutive choice-measurements. In addition,
we assume that choices out of A and B are compatible if A ∪ B 6= X . Thus, our agent is
“more classical” than in Model 2.
As in the classical case we can perform binary and ternary measurements on each triple
of items taken separately and reveal a linear order on that triple. It is therefore natural to
identify the set of pure states with the collection of those linear orders. There are 24 such
orders: [a > b > c], [c > d > a], and so on.
Suppose that the state is [a > b > c].
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1) If A ⊂ {a, b, c} then the outcome of choice-measurement A is determined by the order
a > b > c; the measurement does not change the state.
2) If we perform measurement A with outcome set {a, b, d}, the new state will be [a >
b > d], [a > d > b] or [d > a > b] with equal chances; the outcomes are a, a and d
correspondingly. For A = {a, c, d} or {b, c, d} the new states are defined similarly.
3) If we perform measurement A with outcome set {a, d}, the new state can be one of
[a > b > d], [a > c > d], [a > d > b], [a > d > c], [d > a > b], and [d > a > c] with equal
chances. In the first four cases the outcome is a; in the two last cases the outcome is d.
Similarly for A = {b, d} and A = {c, d}.
The eigenset of the measurement abc corresponding to a is {[a > b > c], [a > c > b]}.
The eigenset of the measurement ab corresponding to a is {[a > b > c], [a > c > b], [a >
b > d], [a > d > b], [c > a > b], [d > a > b]}.
Consider now a choice out of the set {a, b, c, d} . It is not a first-kind choice-measurement.
Here many scenarios are possible. We shall assume the agent proceeds by making two (first-
kind) measurements. First she chooses from a pair then from the triple consisting of the first
selected item and the two remaining items. We can call this behavior ”procedural rational”
because the agent proceeds as if she had preferences over the 4 items.
Let us consider the following scenario. Assume that the agent just made a choice in abc
and that the outcome was abc so the state belongs to {[c > b > a], [c > a > b]}. Suppose that
when confronted with abcd the agent follows the following procedure she performs the mea-
surement ab and then the measurement bcd (this means that the first outcome is ab). After
the first measurement, the state can be anyone of [c > b > a], [b > a > d] , [b > d > a] and
[d > b > a] . Therefore the outcome of bcd can be b. This violates of the principle of inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) and demonstrates preference reversal.8
The examples above demonstrate that there can be many different models of one and
same measurable system. Which of them is the correct one? It is an empirical question.
We also see from this illustration that as we consider the possibility of incompatible choice-
measurements on subsets of X , the behavior of a non-classical rational man differs from that
of a classical rational man in ways that can accommodate behavioral anomalies.
8In models 1 and 2 we could also obtain a phenomena of preference reversal but not in two consecutive
choices. Model 3 allows for that because the choice out of four items is a compound measurement.
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5 Basic structure on the state space
In this section we go further with the formal investigation. We show that if the model
of a measurable system (M, S, µ, τ) is endowed with some additional properties (that we
formulate as axioms) then the set of states is equipped with the structure of an orthomodular
ortho-separable orthospace.
5.1 Properties
We remind that, for M ∈ M and A ⊂ O(M), we introduced the set EM (A) as the set of
states s such that when performing measurement M on a system in state s, the result of the
measurement belongs to A for sure. The sets of the form EM(A) are called properties of our
system, namely the property to imply A when performing measurement M .
Different instruments measure different properties of a system. But it may happen that
one and the same property can be measured by several instruments. We require that in
such a case the probability for the property does not depend on the instrument. We note
that Model 1 from Section 4 does not meet that requirement. Indeed, property [a] can be
obtained by measurements abc and ab. But in state [c] , outcome a never obtains with the
first instrument while a obtains with probability 1/2 with the second instrument. Yet, this is
a very reasonable requirement and we impose the following (slightly stronger) monotonicity
condition:
Axiom 1 Let M and M ′ be two measurements, let A ⊂ O(M), and A′ ⊂ O(M ′). Suppose
that EM(A) ⊂ EM ′(A
′). Then µM(A|s) ≤ µM ′(A
′|s) for any state s.
In particular, if P = EM(A) = EM ′(A
′) is a property then the probabilities µM(A|s)
and µM ′(A
′|s) are equal and depend only on the property P . We denote this number as
s(P ) and understand it as the probability to obtain property P when performing a suitable
measurement of the system in state s. By definition we have
s(P ) = 1⇔ s ∈ P.
The set of all properties is denoted by P. As a subset of 2S, P is a poset (a partially
ordered set). It has a minimal element 0 = ∅ and a maximal element 1 = S. Any state s ∈ S
defines the monotone function s : P → R+, s(0) = 0, s(1) = 1.
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We now describe another basic structure on the property poset P. Let P = EM(A) be a
property. The subset P op = EM(O(M) \ A) is a property too. We have s(P
op) = 1 − s(P )
for any state s ∈ S. Thus
P op = {s ∈ S, s(P op) = 1} = {s ∈ S, s(P ) = 0}
and the set-property P op depends only on P . We call it the opposite property to P .
Lemma 1 The poset P equipped with the operation ’ is an orthoposet. That is the following
assertions holds:
1) If P ⊂ Q then Qop ⊂ P op;
2) P ∩ P op = ∅ for every property P ;
3) P
′′
= P for every property P .
Proof. 1) Suppose s ∈ Qop. Then s (Qop) = 1 and s (Q) = 1− s (Qop) = 0. Since P ⊂ Q
by Axiom 1 we have that s (P ) = 0 as well. Therefore s (P op) = 1− s (P ) = 1 and s ∈ P op.
Assertions 2) and 3) are obvious. 
From Lemma 1 we obtain that 1 is the only property which contains both P and P op.
Indeed if P ∪ P ′ ⊂ Q then by 1) Qop ⊂ P op ∩ P ′′ = ∅, Qop = 0 and Q = 1. In other words
the supremum P ∨ P op equals 1 in the ortho-poset P. Note that in general P ∪ P op 6= S.
5.2 Orthospaces
The set of states S possesses a similar orthogonality structure. We say that two states s
and t are orthogonal (and write s ⊥ t) if there exists a property P such that s(P ) = 1 and
t(P ) = 0. Since, for the opposite property P op, it holds s(P op) = 0 and t(P op) = 1, we have
t ⊥ s, so that ⊥ is a symmetric relation on the set S. Clearly, ⊥ is an irreflexive relation.
This lead us to the following general notion.
Definition. A symmetric irreflexive binary relation ⊥ on a set X is called an orthogo-
nality relation. A set X equipped with an orthogonality relation ⊥ is called an orthospace.
Example 4. Consider an Euclidean space H equipped with a scalar product (x, y) . We
say that vectors x and y are orthogonal if (x, y) = 0. The symmetry of the orthogonality
relation follows from the symmetry of the scalar product. To obtain the irreflexivity we
have to remove the null vector. So that X = H\{0} is an orthospace. A Hilbert space over
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the field of complex numbers is another example. Such a model is standard for Quantum
Mechanic.
When graphically representing an orthospace, one may connect orthogonal elements and
obtain a (non-oriented) graph. This representation is often the most “economic”, since few
edges need to be written. Alternatively, one may connect non-orthogonal (or tolerant9)
elements. The tolerance graph quickly becomes extremely complex. In simple cases, we
combine the two representations. Dotted lines depict orthogonality and solid lines depict
tolerantness. The graphs of Example 2 (A fly in a box) is in figure 2.
Figure 2
For A ⊂ X , we denote by A⊥ the set of elements that are orthogonal to all elements of
A,
A⊥ = {x ∈ X, x ⊥ A}.
For instance ∅⊥ = X and X⊥ = ∅. If A ⊂ B then B⊥ ⊂ A⊥.
Definition. The subset A⊥⊥ is called the ortho-closure of a subset A. A set F is said
to be ortho-closed (also called a flat ) if F = F⊥⊥.
It is easily seen that for any A ⊂ X, the set A⊥ is ortho-closed. Indeed, let F = A⊥.
Then F ⊂ F⊥⊥. On the other side, A ⊂ A⊥⊥ = F⊥; applying ⊥ we reverse the inclusion
relation F⊥⊥ ⊂ A⊥ = F . In particular, the ortho-closure of any A is ortho-closed.
Let F(X,⊥) denote the set of all flats of orthospace (X,⊥) ordered by the set-theoretical
inclusion, which we denote ≤. It contains the largest element X , denoted 1, and the smallest
element ∅, denoted 0. Moreover the poset F (X,⊥) is a (complete) lattice. The intersection
9The term “tolerant” is used in mathematics to refer to a symmetric and reflexive relation.
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of two (or more) flats is a flat implying that A∧B exists and equals A∩B. The join A∨B
also exists and is given by the formula
A ∨B = (A ∪B)⊥⊥ .
Definition. An ortholattice is a lattice equipped with a mapping ⊥: F → F such that
i. x = x⊥⊥;
ii. x ≤ y if and only if y⊥ ≤ x⊥;
iii. x ∨ x⊥ = 1.
Thus the poset F(X,⊥) is an ortholattice.
5.3 The intersection axiom
We have associated to a measurable system two objects: the orthoposet of properties P and
the ortholattice of flats F(S,⊥). It is intuitively clear that these two objects are closely
related. But for now we can only assert the following inclusion
P op ⊂ P⊥
for a property P . Indeed, by the definition of ⊥, any element of P is orthogonal to any
element of the opposite property P op.
In order to go further we impose the following intersection axiom
Axiom 2 The intersection of any properties is a property.
Axiom 2 puts conditions on the set of measurements as it requires that if P and Q are two
properties there must exist a measurement such that P ∩ Q is one of its eigensets. Axiom
2 is fulfilled in Models 2 and 3 from Section 4. As we shall see this Axiom implies that
properties and flats are the same. To prove this we first get a few consequences of Axiom 2.
Lemma 2 P op = P⊥ for any property P .
Proof. Since P op ⊂ P⊥, we have to check the opposite inclusion P⊥ ⊂ P op. Let t be an
arbitrary element of P⊥, and let s be an arbitrary element of P . Since t⊥s, then by the
definition of ⊥ there exists a property Es such that t ∈ Es and s ∈ E
op
s . Set E = ∩s∈PEs; by
Axiom 2 E is a property. Since E ⊂ Es for any s, we have E
op
s ⊂ E
op. Together with s ∈ Eops
we obtain that P ⊂ Eop. Therefore E ⊂ P op, and we have that t ∈ ∩sEs = E ⊂ P
op. 
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In particular, any property P = (P op)op = (P op)⊥ is orthoclosed. Hence the inclusion
P ⊂ F holds. We now prove the inverse inclusion, that is any flat is a property. We first
establish this faci for flats of the form {s}⊥, where s is a state. Let P (s) denote the least
property containing the state s, that is intersection of all properties containing the state s.
Lemma 3 s⊥ = P (s)op.
Proof. Since s ∈ P (s), we have that P (s)op = P (s)⊥ (by Lemma 1) is contained in
{s}⊥. In order to check the reverse inclusion, we consider an arbitrary element t of {s}⊥.
By definition this means that s ∈ E and t ∈ Eop for some property E. Since P (s) is the
minimal property containing s, we have P (s) ⊂ E. Hence Eop ⊂ P (s)op and t ∈ P (s)op.
This prove the inclusion {s}⊥ ⊂ P (s)op. 
In particular, flats of the form {s}⊥ are properties. Since any flat is an intersection of
subsets of the form {s}⊥, from the intersection axiom we obtain that any flat is a property.
Thus, we proved the following important theorem
Theorem 1 P = F(S,⊥).
From Theorem 1 we see that the orthoclosure A⊥⊥ of a set A is the least property
containing A. It consists of states having the properties that are common to all elements
of A. The elements of A⊥⊥ are also called superpositions of A. The following Proposition
implies that any mixture of A is a superposition of A.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a state s is the convex mixture of states s1, ..., sn with strictly
positive coefficients αi. Then the orthoclosure of s is the same as the orthoclosure of {s1, ..., sn}.
Proof. We have to show that s is endowed with property P if and only if s1, ..., sn are
endowed with property P. s ∈ P ⇔ s (P ) = 1. But s (P ) =
∑
i αisi (P ) . Since si (P ) ≤ 1
and αi > 0 for all i, we have that
∑
i αisi (P ) = 1 if and only if all si (P ) = 1 i.e., if and
only if s1, ..., sn ∈ P . 
Corollary. The natural mapping F(P,⊥) → F(S,⊥), where P is the set of pure states
with the induced orthogonality relation, is an isomorphism of ortholattices.
For this reason we can work with the orthospace P of pure states holding in mind that
mixtures are in principle possible.
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5.4 Atomicity and the preparation axiom
A state s is an atom if the set {s} is orthoclosed. By Proposition 1, any atom is a pure
state. Model 2 from Section 4 shows that the inverse is not true. Nevertheless in the sequel
we restrict our attention to systems in which any pure state is atom. We formulate this
requirement in terms of measurements.
Axiom 3 For any pure state s ∈ P, there exists a measurement M such that {s} is one of
its eigensets.
In other words, any pure state is fully characterized by its properties. Substantively (or
operationally) it means that, given any state s, there exists an experimental set-up which
can “prepare” the system in that state s. Axiom 3 is rather reasonable (it is fulfilled in
Model 3 from Section 4) and we explore its consequences.
Let s and t be two pure states. Due to Axiom 3, the set {t} is a property and therefore
we can speak about s(t) := s({t}), the probability for a transition from the state s to the
state-property t.
Lemma 4 Suppose Axiom 3 is fulfilled. Then t(s) = 0 if and only if s⊥t.
Proof: Let us suppose that s⊥t and let P be a property such that s ∈ P and t(P ) = 0.
From the inclusion {s} ⊂ P and the monotonicity axiom we have t({s}) = 0. The converse
assertion is more obvious because s belongs to the property {s} on which t vanishes. 
Corollary 1 s(t) = 0 if and only if t(s) = 0.
In the general case, s(t) can differ from t(s).
Axiom 3 implies the ortho-separability of the orthospace P. Let us remind that an
orthospace (X,⊥) is called ortho-separable if any single-element subset {x} of X is a flat. It
is easy to check that {x} is a flat if and only if for any y 6= x there exists z orthogonal to x
but not to y. For example, the orthospace in figure 3
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Figure 3
is not ortho-separable, since a⊥⊥ = {a, c, d} 6= {a}.
It is worthwhile noting that any ortho-separable orthospace (X,⊥) can be reconstructed
from the ortho-lattice F(X,⊥). Recall that an atom of a lattice F is a minimal non-zero
elements of F . A lattice F is called atomistic if any element of the lattice is the join of
atoms. If (X,⊥) is an ortho-separable orthospace then F(X,⊥) is a complete atomistic
ortho-lattice.
Conversely, let F be a complete atomistic ortho-lattice. Then, there exists an ortho-
separable orthospace (X,⊥) (unique up to isomorphism) such that F is isomorphic to
F (X,⊥). One needs to take the set of atoms of F as the set X ; atoms x and y are orthog-
onal if x ≤ y⊥. For more details see, for example [20]. Roughly speaking, ortho-separable
orthospaces and atomistic ortholattices are equivalent objects.
5.5 Orthomodularity
It was early recognized that the failure of classical logic to accommodate quantum phenomena
was due to the requirement that the lattice of properties should satisfy the distributivity law.
Birkhoff and von Neumann [3] proposed to substitute the distributivity law by the modularity
law. As it turned out, the weaker notion of orthomodularity proved to be more adequate,
see [13].
Definition. An orthospace (X,⊥) is said to be orthomodular if, for every two flats F
and G such that F ⊂ G there exists an element x ∈ G which is orthogonal to F .
In other words, if x does not belong to a flat F then there exists a superposition of F
and x which is orthogonal to F . Orthomodularity permits constructing orthogonal bases in
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the same way as in Euclidean spaces. An orthobasis of a flat F is a subset B of mutually
orthogonal elements such that F = B⊥⊥. In is easy to see that (for any orthospace) the
maximal flat 1 has an orthobasis. If X is orthomodular then each flat has an orthobasis.
More precisely, there holds
Lemma 5 Let F be a flat in an orthomodular space, and B′ ⊂ F be a subset consisting of
mutually orthogonal elements. Then, there exists an orthobasis B of F containing B′.
Proof. Let B be a maximal (by inclusion) subset in F which contains B′ and consists of
mutually orthogonal elements. We claim that the orthoclosure of B coincides with F . In
opposite case there exists an element x in F orthogonal to B. If we add x to B we extend
B which contradicts the assumption of B being maximal. 
In particular, beginning with the empty B′ we can construct an orthobasis of any flats.
Note, however, that ortobases of the same flat (even the maximal flat 1) can have different
numbers of elements.
The orthomodularity of space (X,⊥) implies the orthomodularity of the corresponding
ortho-lattice of flats F(X,⊥). Recall that an ortho-lattice F is called orthomodular if, for
every its elements a and b such that a ≤ b, the following equality holds
b = a ∨ (b ∧ a⊥).
Lemma 6 An orthospace (X,⊥) is orthomodular if and only if its ortholattice F (X,⊥) is
orthomodular.
Proof. Let (X,⊥) be orthomodular space and let F and G be two flats such that F ⊂ G.
We have to show that G = F ∨(G∧F⊥). Denote by G′ the right hand side of the expression;
it is clear that G′ ⊂ G. If the inclusion is strict then G consists an element x orthogonal to
G′. In particular, x is orthogonal to F , that is x belongs to F⊥. Since x belongs to G as
well then x belongs to G ∩ F⊥ and all the more to G′. But we obtain that x is orthogonal
to x which contradicts the irreflexivity of the orthogonality relation ⊥. Conversely, let the
lattice F(X,⊥) be orthomodular and F ⊂ G be two different flats. Since G = F ∨ (G∩F⊥)
then G∩F⊥ is nonempty. Every element of G∩F⊥ belongs to G and is orthogonal to F . 
We now impose the following requirement
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Axiom 4 Let P and Q be comparable properties (that is either P ⊂ Q or Q ⊂ P ). Then
there exists a measurement M ∈ M such that P = EM(A) and Q = EM(B) for some A,B
in O(M).
This is a serious restriction. For example, it is violated in Model 2 of Section 3. A first
consequence of Axiom 4 is the orthomodularity of the state space.
Proposition 2 If Axiom 4 is fulfilled then the state space S (or P ) is orthomodular.
Indeed, suppose that P ⊂ Q are two different properties. Let M be a measurement such
that P = EM(A) and Q = EM(B) for A,B ⊂ O(M). Obviously, A ⊂ B and this inclusion
is strict. If b ∈ B \ A then every element of EM(b) belongs to Q and is orthogonal to P . 
Another important consequence of Axiom 4 is that any state s ∈ S can be considered as
a probability measure on the orthospace P.
Definition. A probability measure on an orthospace (X,⊥) is a function p : F(X,⊥)→
R+ satisfying the following two requirements:
1) if F and F ′ are orthogonal flats then p(F ∨ F ′) = p(F ) + p(F ′);
2) p(1) = 1.
By induction we obtain the equality p(F1 ∨ ... ∨ Fn) = p(F1) + ... + p(Fn) for any mu-
tually orthogonal flats F1, ..., Fn. It is natural to call this property ortho-additivity. The
requirement 2) is simply a normalization. Note that 1) implies p(0) = 0. If the orthospace
(X,⊥) is orthomodular (what we shall assume) then p is monotone (that is p(F ) ≤ p(Q) for
F ⊂ Q). When all elements of X are orthogonal each to other (and X is a finite set) we
come to conventional notion of a probability measure on X , see 5.1.
We already (see 5.1) represented an arbitrary state s as a function on F(P,⊥). We now
assert that this function is ortho-additive.
Proposition 3 Axiom 4 implies that any state s (as a function on F(P,⊥)) is a probability
measure.
Proof. Since s(1) = 1 we have to check the ortho-additivity of s. Let F and F ′ be two
orthogonal flats, and G = F∨F ′. Since F ⊂ G then, by Axiom 4, there exists a measurement
M such that F = EM(A) and G = EM(B) for A ⊂ B ⊂ O(M). Set A
′ = B \ A.
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We claim that F ′ = EM(A
′). We begin with inclusion ⊂. Let us consider an arbitrary
state t from F ′. The outcome of the measurement M in the state t cannot belong to A
according to orthogonality of t and F . Hence the outcome of the measurement belongs to
A′ with certainty, that is t ∈ EM(A
′). Thus, F ′ ⊂ EM(A
′).
Suppose now that t is a state from EM(A
′), but not from F ′. Due to orthomodularity,
we can assume that t is orthogonal to F ′. Since t is orthogonal to F = EM(A) as well, we
conclude that t is orthogonal to F ∨ F ′ = G and therefore cannot belong to EM(A
′). A
contradiction. The claim is proven.
Now s(F ∨ F ′) = µM((A ∪A
′)|s) = µM(B|s) = s(G). 
In particular, if {b1, ..., bn} is an orthobasis of a property F then s(F ) = s(b1)+ ...+s(bn)
for any state s.
6 Impact of measurements
Here we assume that (M, S, µ, τ) is a model of some measurable system satisfying Axioms
1-4. In the preceding Section we have shown that the state space P is an ortho-separable
orthomodular space. In this section we show that measurements act as orthogonal projections
in this orthospace.
6.1 Ideal measurements
We know that measurements impact on the state, that is the state of a system is modified
by the performance of measurements. Here we investigate measurements that “minimally”
impact on the state. These measurements are called ideal. Let us give a precise definition.
Let M ∈M be a measurement with eigensets F (o) = EM(o), o ∈ O(M).
Definition. A measurementM is ideal if, for every state s, the new state τM,o(s) belongs
to the convex hull of the flat F (o) ∧ (s ∨ F (o)⊥).
Note that we earlier said that the transition mapping τM,o is undefined for states be-
longing to F (o)⊥. This is in agreement with the fact that, for s ∈ F (o)⊥, the flat F (o) ∧
(s ∨ F (o)⊥) = F (o) ∧ F (o)⊥ is empty. On the contrary, if s does not belong to F (o)⊥ then
the flat s ∨ F (o)⊥ is strictly larger than F (o)⊥. According to orthomodularity it contains
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an element orthogonal to F (o)⊥, that is an element belonging to F (o). Therefore the flat
F (o) ∧ (s ∨ F (o)⊥) is nonempty indeed.
Proposition 4 Let M be an ideal measurement. Suppose that a pure state s belong to one of
the eigensets of M . Then the performance of measurement M leaves the state s unaffected.
In that sense an ideal measurement minimally impacts on states or produces “a least
perturbation”.
Proof. Let us suppose that s belongs to the eigenset F = F (o). By the definition of
ideality, the new state is in F ∧ (s∨F⊥). Since s ∈ F we have the dual inclusion F⊥ ⊂ {s}⊥.
By force of orthomodularity s⊥ = F⊥ ∨ (s⊥ ∨ F ). Applying ⊥ we obtain the equality
F ∧ (s∨ F⊥) = s⊥⊥. By Axiom 3, that last set is made out of a single element s. Therefore
the new state coincides with s. 
Let us mention one more property of ideal measurements. When performing an ideal
measurement the new state s′ is not orthogonal to the old state s. This follows from the fact
that F ∧ (s ∨ F⊥) and s⊥ do not intersect. In fact,
s⊥ ∧ F ∧ (s ∨ F⊥) = (s ∨ F⊥)⊥ ∧ (s ∨ F⊥) = 0.
Strengthening Axiom 4, we postulate that there exists sufficiently many ideal measure-
ments. Let M ∈M be a measurement. As we know, different flats EM (o) are orthogonal to
each other. Moreover, the join of all EM(o) is equal to 1. Indeed, if a state s is orthogonal
to EM(o) then EM(o) ⊂ s
⊥ and consequently s(EM(o)) ≤ s(s
⊥) = 1−s(s) = 0; on the other
hand,
∑
o s(EM(o)) = 1. This leads us to the following definition
Definition. An Orthogonal Decomposition of the Unit (ODU) is a finite family of flats
(Fi, i ∈ I) such that
a. Fi and Fj are orthogonal if i 6= j;
b. ∨i∈IFi = 1.
Thus, for a measurement M , the family of eigensets (EM(o), o ∈ O(M)) is an ODU. The
next ideality axiom asserts that any ODU may be obtained as the collection of the eigensets
of some ideal measurement.
Axiom 5 For any ODU (Fi, i ∈ I), there exists an ideal measurement M ∈ M with the
outcome set O(M) = I and the eigensets EM(i) = Fi.
25
Axiom 5 connects ideal measurements with ODUs. This allows to investigate the central
issue of compatibility of measurements which we do next.
6.2 Compatible measurements
In Section 3 we informally discussed the notion of compatible measurements. In order to
consider this issue more formally we need to introduce a notion of commutativity in the
orthomodular space P. Two (or more) flats commute (or are compatible) if they possess a
common orthobasis (see 5.5). More precisely, a family (Fi, i ∈ I) of flats commute if there
exists an orthobasis B of P and a family (Ai, i ∈ I) of subsets of B such that Ai is an
orthobasis of the flat Fi.
For example, flats F and G commute if they are comparable or are orthogonal. One can
show that a family (Fi, i ∈ I) of flats commute if every two member of the family commute.
Lemma 7 Let flats F and G commute. Then F ∧ (G ∨ F⊥) = F ∧G.
Indeed, let B be a common orthobasis of F and G. That is F and G are the orthoclosure
of some subsets A and C of B. Then C ∪ (B \ A) is an orthobasis of the flat G ∨ F⊥ and
A ∩ (C ∪ (B \ A)) = A ∩ C is an orthobasis of the flat F ∧ (G ∨ F⊥). On the other hand,
A ∩ C is an orthobasis of the flat F ∧G. 
LetM andM ′ be two ideal measurements with eigensets EM(o) , o ∈ O(M), and EM ′(o
′),
o′ ∈ O(M ′).
Definition. The ideal measurements M and M ′ are compatible ( or commute) if every
EM(o) commutes with every EM ′(o
′).
We assert that compatible measurements are compatible in the previously mentioned
informal sense, that is performing one of the measurements does not affect the results from
the other measurement. Indeed, suppose that a state s is in an eigenset F := EM(o) and
therefore performing M gives outcome o. Suppose further that we perform measurement
M ′ and obtain an outcome o′. Then the new state s′ is in the flat G ∧ (s ∨ G⊥), where
G = EM ′(o
′). All the more, the new state s′ is in the flat G ∧ (F ∨G⊥) = F ∧G according
to according to Lemma 7. Therefore s′ remain in F , and if we perform the measurement M
again we obtain the same outcome o.
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We next show that two ideal measurements are compatible if and only if they are “coars-
ening” of a third (finer) measurement. First a definition
Definition. A measurement M ′ is coarser than a measurement M (and M is finer than
M ′) if every eigenset of M is contained in some eigenset of M ′.
In other words, outcomes of M ′ can be obtained from outcomes of M by means of a
mapping f : O(M)→ O(M ′). In this case the eigensets EM ′(o
′) have the form EM (f
−1(o′)).
If M ′ and M ′′ both are coarsening of M then they are compatible. For this aim we have
to take an orthobasis common to all eigensets of the measurement M .
Conversely, let M and M ′ be two compatible measurements. Then there exists an or-
thobasis B common for eigensets of M and M ′. If B is a finite set, then we can take as
M ′′ the (complete) measurement corresponding to the ODU B. In the general case, we
have to consider the family of flats (EM(o) ∧ EM ′(o′)), where o runs O(M) and o
′ runs
O(M ′). Because of compatibility, these flats form an ODU. And we have to take as M ′′ the
corresponding measurement which exists by Axiom 5.
Thus, we proved the following
Theorem 2 Ideal measurements M and M ′ are compatible if and only if there exists an
ideal measurement refining both M and M ′.
6.3 Canonical decomposition of a model
We now show that a model of a measurable system satisfying Axioms 1 to 5 can be written as
the direct sums of its irreducible submodels. The argument below holds for any orthospace
but is of largest interest for ortho-separable orthospaces.
Let (X,⊥) be an orthospace. We say that two elements of X are connected if they can
be linked be a chain of pairwise non-orthogonal (tolerant) elements. This relation is an
equivalence relation and therefore divides the set X into classes of connected elements which
we denote X(ω), ω ∈ Ω. Elements from different connected components are orthogonal to
each other; therefore X(ω) are flats. These flats are called central or classical.
If F is a flat in X then, for any ω, the set F ∩ X(ω) is a flat in the orthospace X(ω)
equipped with the induced orthogonality relation. Conversely, suppose we have a collection
of flats F (ω) in X(ω), ω ∈ Ω. Then the union F = ∪ωFω is a flat in X . In other words, the
ortholattice F(X,⊥) is the direct (orthogonal) product of ortholattices F(X(ω),⊥).
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Let us go back to a model of a measurable system with orthospace (P,⊥). As any or-
thospace, P decomposes into connected (or irreducible) components P(ω), ω ∈ Ω. Since these
components form an ODU then, by Axiom 4, there exists a corresponding ideal measurement
C. Since any state is in some component, Proposition 4 implies that the measurement C
affects no state. It is natural to call the measurement C classical and to call the correspond-
ing components X(ω) classical super-states. The classical measurement C commutes with
any ideal measurement. For this reason, we can without loss of generality, consider only
irreducible models.
6.4 Axiom of Purity
The property of ideality of measurements significantly narrowed down the range of the
possible impact of a measurement on the state. We know that as we obtain the result o the
system moves from state s to state s′ belonging to the convex hull of the flat EM(o) ∧ (s ∨
EM(o)
⊥). If this flat is an atom, the new state is uniquely determined. But if this flat is not
an atom (and that is fully possible) the new state may be a probabilistic mixture of states
in EM(o) ∧ (s ∨ EM(o)
⊥).
To see this, let us consider the example of a fly in a 3×2 box. There are two measurements:
LR and FCB. Suppose the state F is realized as a probability measure F (L) = F (C) =
F (R) = 1/3 (of course, F (F ) = 1 and F (B) = 0 ). If we, in the state F , perform a
measurement with eigensets {L} and {L}⊥ = {C,R} and obtain outcome ”not L”, we may
conclude that the image of F is not a pure state but the equiprobable mixture of states C
and R. Such a conclusion is in agreement with the ideality of the measurement {C,R} which
sends the state F into {C,R} ∧ (F ∨ {C,R}⊥) = {C,R} ∧ (F ∨ L) = {C,R} ∧ 1 = {C,R}.
We introduce a last axiom guaranteeing that under the impact of a measurement any
pure state jumps into another pure state. Namely, we consider the following axiom of purity
Axiom 6 For any pure state s ∈ P and any flat F the flat F ∧ (s ∨ F⊥) is an atom of the
lattice F(P,⊥).
We have introduced above a number of non-trivial axioms. We assert that they are all
compatible with each other. Indeed, Example 2 (A fly in a box) gives a model satisfying to
all axioms. Another example is the so-called Hilbert space model of Quantum Mechanics.
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Example 4 (continued). Let H be a (finite-dimensional) Euclidean space, as in Example
4. And let P be the set of all one-dimensional vector subspaces of H . The orthogonality
relation is clear from Example 4. Any flat is given by a vector subspace V and consists of
one-dimensional subspaces in V . Measurements are identified with ODUs. Suppose that
(Vi, i ∈ I) is a family of pairwise orthogonal vector subspaces in H and
∑
i Vi = H , and
let v be a (non-zero) vector in H representing some state s. Denote by vi the orthogonal
projections of v on subspace Vi. Then under impact of the corresponding measurement the
state s moves into the state vi with probability cos
2(ϕ), where ϕ is the angle between the
vectors v and vi (the probability is 0, if vi = 0), and give the outcome i. By the construction,
this measurement is ideal. It is easy to check that all other axioms also are fulfilled.
Remark. In some sense Example 4 is not only a special case. If the height of F is
more than 3 then the lattice F can be realized as a (ortho)lattice of vector subspaces of
some Hermitian space over some ∗-field K.10 The details can be found in [2] or in [11]. If
we additionally require that the orthospace P is compact and connected (as a topological
subspace of ∆(P,⊥)) then the field K is the real field R, the complex field C or the skew
field H of quaternions.
7 Non-classical models in social sciences: A discussion
In the last section we want to discuss some of the key properties of general measurable
systems in order to help the reader assess their relevance for social sciences. We wish to
emphasize that this section is highly explorative and should be viewed as a first step that
only aims at opening the discussion.
When applying the theory of measurable system exposed in this paper to behavioral and
social sciences, the general idea is to view an individual as a measurable system. She is
characterized by her type which encapsulates information about her preferences, attitudes,
beliefs, feelings etc. A decision situation (a situation such that she must choose an alternative
out of set of alternatives) or a questionnaire is a device that measures her type. Actual
behavior, e.g. the choice made in a decision situation, the actions taken in a game or the
10The case of the height 1 is trivial: F = {0, 1} and P consists of single state. The case of the height 2
is of more interest. The (ortho)lattice F = {0, 1} ∪ P, and the mapping s 7→ s⊥ acts on the set P as an
involution without fixed points. The case of the height 3 is very intricate and unclear.
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answer given to a questionnaire are measurement outcomes.
In the Introduction we formulated a question as to whether it is possible to build an
interesting theory about a system that changes when being measured. We answered by the
affirmative when imposing a series of properties on measurements and on their interaction
with the system. The state space representing the system is then endowed with the structure
of an atomistic orthomodular orthospace and the states are realized as probability measures
on the state space. We next propose a psychological and behavioral interpretation of some
of those properties.
First kindness
The first key property of a measurable system is that measurements satisfy first-kindness.
Classical measurement theory (including revealed preference theory) also relies on such an
assumption of repeatability. Some reservation may be in place. We do propose that a choice
be viewed as a measurement outcome that reveals or more precisely actualizes preferences.
But in many settings the repeated character of a choice changes the decision situation.
Clearly, a repeated interaction in a game situation is not equivalent to a repetition of one
and the same decision situation. The prolific theory of repeated games amply illustrates
this. So the repeatedness we have in mind pertains to elementary situations.
Compared with standard revealed preference theory, the requirement of repeatability is
limited in two respects. The property applies to a smaller set of choice experiments. As we
illustrated in section 4 not all choice sets can be associated with a first-kind measurement
unless we are dealing with a fully classical agent. Moreover repeatability is only requested
in two consecutive identical measurements. If another (incompatible) measurement is per-
formed on the system in-between, the initial result may not be repeated. Therefore although
the property of first-kindness is somehow restrictive it is still far less demanding than the
standard classical assumption. Yet, it is not an innocuous assumption and in particular it
precludes stochastic preferences.
Invariance
Axiom 1 is an axiom of invariance. In the context of choice theory, it is related to the
principle of procedure invariance assumed in classical rational choice theory. This principle
states that a preference relation should not depend on the procedure of elicitation. Numerous
experimental studies were made on choice versus pricing to exhibit examples of violation
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of procedure invariance. It is beyond the scope of this short comment to systematically
compare the classical concept of procedure invariance with Axiom 1. We confine ourselves to
remarking that Axiom 1 applies to systems in the same state and to remind that it concerns
first-kind measurements only. In particular, we do not take for granted that the pricing
or the matching procedure which are considered as computationally relatively demanding
(compared with a choice procedure) can be performed as a single measurement rather than
as a sequence of (possibly incompatible) measurements.
Axioms 2, 3, 4 and 5 are axioms which all formulate requirements on the richness of the
set of measurements. Another way to look at them that lends itself to an interpretation in
choice theory is that when the set of primitive measurements is actually limited - in Model
2 there could only be 4 measurements - the axioms imply that choice-measurements may
not all be incompatible with each other. Indeed, it is immediate to see that these axioms
are fulfilled for compatible measurements as these can be combined into new measurements
satisfying the axioms. For this very reason these axioms do seem very natural to a classically
minded person. In a non-classical world they do not follow naturally, which is demonstrated
by the fact that these axioms are violated in Model 2. Hence, in a choice theoretic context,
these axioms put a limit on how “non-classical” agent (a behavioral system) is allowed to
be. Model 3 satisfies all these axioms and still allows for so-called “behavioral anomalies”.
States and types
The notion of state is closely related to Harsanyi’s classical notion of type which is why
we use this term when referring to the state of agents. The Harsanyi type of an agent is a
complete description of her preferences, beliefs and private information such that it allows
predicting the agent’s behavior. By observing past behavior, we learn about an agent’s
type and can make finer predictions of her future behavior. In Harsanyi’s classical world
an information about past behavior is used to predict future behavior relying on Bayesian
updating. The same holds for any compatible choice-measurements made on a non-classical
agent. But generally (when some measurements are incompatible) learning is not Bayesian.
In Model 3 of section 4, we saw that the performance of the ab measurement on the agent in
state s ∈ {[c > b > a] , [c > a > b]} erases information about her preferences what concerns
the ordering between b and c so the agent can choose b in {b, c, d}.
As in Harsanyi’s model, a non-classical pure type is maximal information about the agent.
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But in contrast with Harsanyi, a pure type may still be dispersed (cf Section 3.4) so knowing
the pure type does not allow to predict behavior with certainty. This is reflected in the
structure of the type space. In Harsanyi’s type space types are orthogonal to each other. In
the non-classical model not all (pure) type are orthogonal. Instead, non-orthogonal states
are connected with each other in the sense that under the impact of a measurement the state
of the system can transit from one state to another. This strongly contrasts with Harsanyi’s
static model where the act of choosing (i.e. a measurement of the type) has no impact on
the type only on payoffs. The non-classical type space models a changing agent, we return
to this aspect below.
Incompatible measurements
In the models of rational choice of Section 4 measurements corresponds to sets of alter-
natives from which the agent makes a choice. Whichever model we choose, the existence of
incompatible choice-measurements implies that the agent cannot have a preference order on
all items simultaneously. Our theory gives a precise meaning to this impossibility. It means:
i) if the ordering over some subset of items is known (possibly only to the agent) then his
preferences over another incompatible subset is random (dispersed pure states); ii) as the
agent makes a choice in a given choice set his type (preferences) is being modified (measure-
ments affect the state). A non-classical agent does not have a fixed type (preferences). The
non-classical model is consistent with the hypothesis that an agent’s preferences are shaped
in the process of elicitation as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (see Introduction).
Thus, the distinctive feature of the non-classical model namely the existence of incompat-
ible measurements (or alternatively the existence of dispersed states) delivers a formulation
of bounded rationality as the impossibility to compare and order all items simultaneously.
We view this formulation as particularly interesting because it is also linked to the idea that
an agent’s preferences are “context-dependent” (see [12], part 6). Both these themes: the
issue of comparability in the universal set of items and intrinsic contextuality of preferences
are central themes in behavioral and experimental economics.
As for today there is no consensus in Physics about the reasons for the non-classicality
of quantum physical phenomena. There exists however a huge literature on the subject in
epistemology. We do not wish to speculate on reasons for such phenomena in human be-
havior. Instead, we note that the (possible) non-classicality of agents invites social scientists
to making interactions the central object of their investigation. Clearly, game theory is all
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about interactions but it retains that the type of agents is exogenous. This cannot be main-
tained if agents are non-classical systems. Instead we ought to make agents’ type as (partly)
endogenous to interaction. 11 We are currently investigating simpler game situations along
these lines and we trust that it is a promising avenue of research.
The Stability of the state
The minimal perturbation principle (ideality) means that a coarse measurement leaves
unperturbed the uncertainty not sorted out by its set of outcomes. Axiom 5 demands that
there exists sufficiently many such ideal measurements.
In applications to behavioral sciences, an interpretation is that when asked to choose out
of an initial “state of hesitation” (a dispersed pure state), this hesitation is only resolved so as
to be able to produce an answer but no more. The remaining uncertainty is left “untouched”.
One way to understand this is to see that when we assume that a choice measurement is
ideal it is as if we assumed that the individual proceeds by taking the ”shortest way” to
resolve uncertainty. For instance, suppose as in Model 3 that we ask an individual to make
a choice out of {a, b, c} and that her initial state is a superposition (see section 5.3) of all
six orders. The minimal perturbation principle entails that the individual will proceed so
as to find the most preferred item without ordering the 3 items. Uncertainty not resolved
by an ideal choice-measurement is left untouched. Therefore we say that ideality implies
a certain stability of the type of a non-classical agent. This can be contrasted with the
classical assumption of complete stability, i.e. revealing preferences does not affect them at
all. Nevertheless ideality may turn out a rather demanding property, which should be viewed
as an approximation.
Axiom 6 further precises the impact of measurement. It tells us exactly were a mea-
surement takes the state. We focus on an informational interpretation. In a social science
context it implies that whatever choice the individual makes that changes her (pure) type,
the new behavioral type encapsulates maximal information about behavior as did the ini-
tial type and by ideality we know the new state.12 In a classical context such a pure state
corresponds to a state of complete information. In a non-classical context we know that
11Geanakoplos et al. (1989) pioneered an approach in psychological games where agent’s motivation
(utility) depends on other’s beliefs and therefore are endogenous to the interaction.
12Information in a pure state is maximal in the sense that no new information can be obtained
from any measurement without losing some other information, i.e. information that was true
in the initial state but is no longer true in the new state.
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there exist dispersed pure states and so a maximal information type (a pure type) does not
uniquely predict behavior in all circumstances.
Caveat
In applications to behavioral sciences a less attractive feature of our framework is that a
measurement erases information about the previous type. We should however recall that a
person is expected to be composed of a number of irreducible systems. The loss of memory
only applies locally, within one (irreducible) sub-system. Even within such a system, when
assuming ideality, memory is fully lost only in the case the measurement is complete (not
coarse). Yet, our approach implies that to some extent an individual’s previous choices are not
relevant to her current type. She may recall them but she experiences that she has changed.
Implicitly, we assume that at a higher cognitive level, the individual accepts changes in, e.g.
her tastes, which are not motivated by new cognition.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have described the basic structure of non-classical measurement theory. The
objective has been to investigate, from a theoretical point of view, whether this framework
could be suitable for describing, explaining and predicting human behavior.
As a non-classical measurable system, an agent is characterized by her type (preferences,
attitudes, beliefs etc...) which changes when she makes a choice actualizing her type. As a
consequence behavior exhibits an irreducible uncertainty. Yet, as we impose some axioms on
the interaction between measurements and the system, behavior is characterized by sufficient
regularity to allow for predictions. We have argued that some of the basic axioms and
properties that underline the theory can be given a meaningful interpretation consistent with
central themes addressed in psychology, behavioral and social sciences. We also argued that
the distinctive feature of non-classical measurement theory, i.e. the existence of incompatible
measurements, provides an appealing formulation of bounded rationality.
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